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Illegal Diversification Strategies in the Farming Community from a UK perspective 
 
Abstract 
Illegal diversification strategies in farming contexts are neglected in research terms. 
There are endogenous and exogenous factors that influence the potential strategic ca-
pability and activity of illegal entrepreneurs and criminal farmers. Internal factors in-
clude the personal characteristics of the farmer–qualities and skills. External factors, 
outside the control of the individual illegal entrepreneur, include the activities and pro-
cesses undertaken by them, the characteristics of the illegal enterprise, government pol-
icies, markets and environmental factors. Using a documentary research methodology 
of 210 case studies, located on the internet, from across the UK (where farmers had 
been charged with criminal offences relating to their occupation) The article contributes 
to the literature on farm diversification and rural crime. 
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1. Introduction 
We focus on ‘Illegal’ and ‘Criminal Entrepreneurship’ in a rural context as a neglected 
rural geography (Philo, 1992). The literature on illegal entrepreneurship in relation to 
strategic planning or illegal finance, in particular, is sparse as evidenced by the lack of 
coverage and tendency to focus on corruption rather than the individual entrepreneur 
(See Bouman, 1990/2008; Smith and McElwee, 2013; Smith and McElwee, 2015). In-
deed, Bouman (2008) defines informal finance as being ‘identified with a money mar-
ket dominated by the unscrupulous. Yet, Illegal or Criminal Entrepreneurship as de-
fined by Baumol (1990) is a reality in every type of economy including the rural. Thus, 
entrepreneurship can be productive, unproductive and even destructive (Baumol, 
1990). Economic indicators from developed and developing nations suggest that such 
destructive entrepreneurial practices are on the increase (Smallbone, and Welter, 2010 
Webb et al, 2009). Most governments strive to reduce illegal activities by either pre-
ventative or deterrence measures such as education and enterprise support or through 
punitive measures such as detection and prosecution. Many entrepreneurs also draw on 
illegal entrepreneurial experiences in terms of strategic decision-making (Aidis and van 
Pragg, 2007). Nevertheless, the extent of illegal entrepreneurship can never be fully 
known, as gaining access to such entrepreneurs is problematic (as it is a neglected, 
hidden phenomenon – Philo, 1992). Even when apprehended by official processes, such 
entrepreneurs are unlikely to cooperate with official bodies or academics and so the 
darker side of strategic decision-making remains unclear. Bouman reminisces that as a 
lone researcher in finance in the 1970s when he first submitted a conference paper on 
the exploits of informal financial intermediaries, his ideas were regarded as eccentric. 
This resonates with us because, in researching the rogue and criminal farmer, we too 
have encountered resistance from individuals within the farming community and also, 
from farming academics and institutional gatekeepers in the farming industry. Indeed, 
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a general attitude of disbelief and denial permeates the industry. This extends to a view 
that it is not helpful to promote negative stereotypes of farmers because this may upset 
powerful farming interests and lead to research being frustrated and marginalized. 
       The contexts of this study are rurality and the food industry. There are no officially 
accepted statistics for food crime in the UK other than the accepted total value of the 
food and drinks sector – which is a £200 billion industry. UK official Crime statistics 
do not report on such crimes. In their strategic overview Morling and McNaughton 
(2016) do not provide figures but use news media and vignettes to support their strate-
gic review.1 They do, however, mention rogues in passing and acknowledge that there 
is some organized criminal activity but treat food crime as an activity perpetrated on 
the industry, not by some of its more unscrupulous stakeholders. However, newspaper 
reports and industry bodies suggest that it could be anything from £1.7 to 11 billion but 
there is no definitive figure.2 Academics are at the forefront of investigating insider 
activity and there are numerous articles in press on the subject (see for example, Man-
ning, Smith & Soon, 2016; Fassam & Dani, 2017; and Smith, 2017).     
This article contributes by extending the potential and implications for the diversi-
fication and activities of rural businesses and businesses involved in the agricul-
tural/farm supply chain to include examples of informal and criminal pluriactivity. We 
                                                 
1 The report is jointly authored by Morling and McNaughton and includes evidence obtained in their 
roles as Heads of the National Food Crime Unit and Scottish Food crime and Incidents Unit (Food stand-
ards Agency and Food Standards Scotland. The report reflects an official reluctance to highlight insider 
crime shared by The National Farmers Union and other representative bodies.  
2  See the report in the Telegraph by journalist Lexi Finnigan on the subject - http://www.tele-
graph.co.uk/news/2016/03/24/food-fraud-in-the-uk-toxic-vodka-and-pet-food-meat-given-to-huma/ and 
also http://www.newfoodmagazine.com/22854/blogs/food-fraud-an-emerging-risk-for-the-food-and-
drink-industry/ 
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are primarily interested in farmers who are dependent on the land for an income, or 
farmers with diversified business interests such as abattoir owners. We define farm di-
versification in terms of ‘livelihood’ (Hussein and Nelson, 1998). This includes on-
and-off-farm activities, resources and skills, which generate extra income by creating 
additional agricultural or non-agricultural products, or supplement farm incomes by 
self-employment or paid labour (Spiller, 2015). Diversification relates to strategically 
systematic planned movement away from core business activities (McElwee, 2006).  
However, seldom are informal and criminal diversification strategies of farmers taken 
into account. We thus extend a previous iteration of a segmentation framework for un-
derstanding types of farm diversification (McElwee and Smith, 2012).  
Successful illegal entrepreneurs utilise complementary skill sets (Smith and McEl-
wee, 2013), which mirror legal forms of enterprise including - cooperation and net-
working; marketing; business and managerial skills; entrepreneurial qualities and val-
ues; as well as technical and professional skills. This means that ‘entrepreneurs’ who 
operate illegally have similar combinations of enterprise skills (networking, strategic 
awareness capability, long range planning, customer knowledge and market under-
standing) as legal entrepreneurs (Smith and McElwee, 2013). What differentiates them 
from their law-abiding peers is their attitude to risk and willingness to break laws and 
transgress social and ethical norms and mores.   
We argue that following Baumol’s definition, illegal entrepreneurs operate in any 
domain in any product, in any market and in any value chain where there is an oppor-
tunity to exploit by circumnavigating legal processes (Baumol, 1990). Indeed, illegal 
entrepreneurs may be more entrepreneurial than legal entrepreneurs as they utilise a 
greater number of skills to remain in business. In this paper, we document, articulate 
and narrate what illegal diversification strategies used by rogue and criminal farmers 
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are evident from the literature and from our empirical research. This is important be-
cause of the paucity of academic literature on the subject. Our research question is 
therefore relatively straightforward – what are these illegal diversification strategies? 
We ask what should be the concerns in relation to illegal entrepreneurship - i.e. the 
entrepreneurial processes, the entrepreneurial venture and the entrepreneur? Secondly, 
why should such stakeholders be concerned about illegal entrepreneurship? And 
thirdly, what are the consequences for not being concerned? Farming is the industry 
specific setting for our enquiry. We define what we understand to be illegal entrepre-
neurship whilst noting and commenting on the diversity of stakeholders involved: either 
as entrepreneurs, colluders in the illegal entrepreneurial process, in prevention and 
those involved in exposing and punishing the entrepreneur. Thus, in the process of 
providing a conceptual framework for understanding illegal entrepreneurship populated 
by examples, we present an extended conceptual framework, which considers various 
approaches to understanding the phenomenon, and distinguish between the informal 
economy and illegal entrepreneurship. There is no simple continuum between what is 
legal and what is not. We place emphasis on the pressures for diversification and the 
nature of that diversification and barriers to diversification are identified and discussed. 
The article is structured as follows. A synthesis of the literature and empirical research 
is provided, followed by the methodology section and an overview of the literature 
relating to key themes to drive the structure and subsequent lines of argumentation. We 
then present our empirical evidence, which we use to make comment upon aspects of 
the literature. We conclude by opening a discussion of how theories of illegal entrepre-
neurship impact on the situation in this study.   
 
2. A literature overview on the informal and criminal economies 
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The informal economy is a 'market based production of goods and services, whether 
legal or illegal, that escapes detection in official estimates of GDP' (Smith, 1994.18). 
The informal and grey economies are distinct but merge into the legal and criminal 
economies and that illegal enterprise is prevalent (Williams, 2010, Livingston, et al, 
2014). But why, is this so? Perhaps instead of asking why illegal enterprise is prevalent 
a different approach would be to ask why it is not more prevalent. However, because 
little has been written about the informal and criminal in relation to diversification (par-
ticularly in a farming context) it is necessary to begin with an overview of what has 
been written in relation to the legal. 
 
2.1. The entrepreneurial farmer and other farming stereotypes 
Entrepreneurship is about economic individualism and competition (Gray, 2002 p. 61) 
and can be defined as “the creation and extraction of value from an environment” (An-
derson, 1995). We appreciate that there are many types of entrepreneurs. However, we 
subscribe to the thesis of the entrepreneurial farmer (McElwee, 2006; and Richards and 
Bulkley, 2007), albeit we accept that not all small farmers are entrepreneurial, nor very 
competitive by nature. Nevertheless, as McElwee notes, many farmers are risk-averse 
despite being shrewd and calculative with money and Profit maximization in states of 
constant uncertainty combined with the ever-present possibility of failure, characterize 
farming, but many farms have limited opportunities in terms of growth orientation and 
limited opportunity to expand. Nevertheless, farmers are generally innovative in nature 
when it comes to making or saving money. Smith and McElwee (2013) discuss the 
types of illegal activities that generate extra income.    
Farmers are not a homogenous type encompassing as it does existing bucolic stere-
otypes such as the ‘Gentleman-Farmer’ (Sutherland, 2012), the ‘Part-Time Farmer’, the 
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‘Tenant-Farmer’, the ‘Arable-Farmer’, or the ‘Hill-Farmer’ (Gasson, 1986); the ‘Good-
Farmer’ (Saugeres, 2002); and the farmer as a hegemonic ‘Patriarch’ (Price and Evans. 
2009). Farmers are socially constructed as hero-figure, albeit a lesser stereotype of the 
‘Bad-Farmer’ (Richards and Bulkley, 2007) does exist. So why should there be a si-
lence in the literature to the rogue or criminal farmer (Smith, 2004)?    
 
2.2. Legal Growth Strategies open to adaption by the Entrepreneurial Farmer  
It is helpful to consider legal diversification and differentiation strategies through which 
one can obtain sustainable competitive advantage (Aakers, 2001; Merson, 2016), be-
cause the presence, or absence, of legal avenues can influence, or determine, whether 
illegal strategies are an option.  McElwee and Smith (2012) articulated how formal and 
legal income generation streams are the mainstay of any farm-based business. Rational 
farmers would likely choose to exhaust legal opportunities before considering illegal 
ones, albeit that criminal diversification strategies could appeal to some farmers who 
have a heritage of engaging in illegal activity via socialisation into such practices. This 
rational conscious choice to engage in illegal activity separates the criminal farmer from 
the rogue-farmer. There are several generic legal strategies that farmers and rural en-
trepreneurs can adopt. Table 1 based on Aakers (2001) ‘sets out’ the dimensions, which 
may influence the decision of an entrepreneur to engage in legal or illegal entrepreneur-
ial practices, or not.  
Table 1 here 
These dimensions include moral, legalistic, economic and social dimensions (MacFar-
lane, 1996) and can be regarded as value adding activities, which compliment a busi-
ness by boosting its financial, social and reputational capital. Legal income generating 
diversification strategies assume a degree of uncertainty which can be mitigated against 
by well-researched and realistic strategies (Shane, 2003). These improve survival rates 
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and profitability, and add a level of legitimacy (Hannon and Atherton, 1998). However, 
in illegal ventures it is unlikely that there will be a written business plan, Frith and 
McElwee (2007). Like legal strategies, illegal strategies change ‘according to circum-
stances’, Frith and McElwee, (2007.274) and are influenced by the skills and compe-
tencies of the entrepreneur and existing resources. Illegal forms of entrepreneurship 
may also add value in that its unintended consequences are an increase in an entrepre-
neurial ethos and more competition (Baumol, 1990). The informal sector contributes to 
the economy too (Williams and Round, 2009) and the profit from illegal enterprise may 
be channeled into the formal economy. Figure 1 ‘sets out’ nine possible change op-
tions/strategies, which illegal entrepreneurs may pursue at any given time. 
Figure 1 here 
Two options involve not engaging in illegal pluriactivity, whilst the option of do noth-
ing, might be considered a negative strategy it may be a good long-term survival pro-
spects. The other strategies range from growth strategies to full-scale diversification 
strategies, and offer a variety of ways for illegal entrepreneurs to develop their business 
to consolidate existing strengths, or grasp new opportunities. Each option has its own 
unique challenges and barriers.  
 
Growth by Expansion: Is the most obvious strategy (Aakers, 2001), but purchasing, 
or renting, additional land is not always possible, nor is borrowing money straightfor-
ward or viable.  Nevertheless, for many farm entrepreneurs (McElwee, 2006), business 
expansion to increase returns to scale, is a good first option in pursuing strategic change. 
The entrepreneur must ‘weigh up’ the associated uncertainty. If the risk involved by 
expansion involves trading on existing competencies and resources (internal and exter-
nal) then the risk is comparatively low. Nevertheless, the gains associated with employ-
9 
ing growth strategies tend to be lower than those gained through adopting riskier strat-
egies where potential gains (and losses) are much greater. However, gaining entry to 
such high value diversification opportunities can involve considerable cost as signifi-
cant capital outlay is required. Moreover, profit margins in such ventures are usually 
small due to the high volume of turnover and low profit margins. Growth is not then 
the most obvious change strategy and many entrepreneurs elect to pursue other poten-
tially more rewarding change strategies. In farming, the legal opportunities to expand 
are constrained and financially costly making expansion difficult. This can make illegal 
strategies more appealing. 
 
Different Use of Capacity by Specialisation: Maximising product range is a sound 
strategy, but there is a big difference between being a price taker, and not a price maker 
(Aakers, 2001). Sometimes diversification is about maintaining market place, or sur-
viving. To counter this, entrepreneurs may use their existing resources differently, en-
gaging in specialised activities. Increased specialisation enables legal, and illegal, 
Smith and McElwee (2013) businesses to augment their existing competencies by fo-
cusing exclusively on a narrow market offering. Increased specialisation carries with it 
notable risks. Many entrepreneurs diversify product range to help minimise other risks. 
Again, specialisation for farmers is a risky proposition because good husbandry dictates 
spreading activities and risks. The extant literature is silent on using specialisation and 
rural social capital (Hofferth and Iceland, 1998) in illegal settings. 
 
Growth by Expansion of Production: A viable means of specialisation available to 
owners/managers is to move away from a specialised activity with little market share 
and concentrate on expanding production (Aakers, 2001). However, in farming with 
quota restrictions this is not always an option because of land shortage, or distance from 
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markets (Aakers, 2001). This is only a viable strategy in illegal settings if parallel pro-
duction and supply-chains can be operationalised covertly. 
 
Enlarge Capacity by Vertical Integration: This is a common strategy in legal entre-
preneurial practice (see Aakers, 2001). For Aakers, Changes in strategic direction often 
occur due to pressure from customers to reduce product prices, thus endangering the 
long-term survival prospects of the business. Thus, entrepreneurs must ‘claw back’ con-
trol of their business to regain decision-making powers wrested away from them. In 
farming, vertical integration is not always a viable option. Nor can one legitimately 
vertically integrate illegal and legal value chains. This makes this strategy non-viable. 
 
Co-operation with Other entrepreneurs: Cooperation and strategic positioning 
(Aakers, 2001) as opposed to growth strategies that involve acquiring/leveraging inter-
nal resources, many entrepreneurs choose to engage in joint ventures with other entre-
preneurs, to improve economies of scale and scope to combine resources to engage 
beyond their individual means. Cooperation secures benefits associated with large scale 
activities, whilst minimising the risks of ‘going alone’ but entails relinquishment of a 
degree of autonomy that many owners take for granted. Such opportunities are rare in 
farming. In illegal enterprise, this is a very viable strategy because existing networks 
can be implemented for both legal, and illegal, activity. 
 
Diversification into a different Business: In response to falling profit margins asso-
ciated with traditional business forms, entrepreneurs can use existing resources, or re-
lease capital tied up in land-ownership to pursue different forms of business activity 
entirely (Aakers, 2001). One can enter the property market by selling off land, or out-
buildings, to outside construction companies but this is a one-off diversification (selling 
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the family silver). Renting is an option and the property may be used for legal, or illegal 
ventures. This is a more viable strategy for farmers. Nevertheless, such practices like 
selling off land or property tend to be one off transactions.  
There are many barriers to strategic change which obstruct, or restrain, strategic change 
plans and range from opportunity discovery, individual differences in decisions to ex-
ploit, psychological or environmental contexts of entrepreneurship, or resource acqui-
sition issues. The biggest barrier to farmers is location and proximity to markets (McEl-
wee, 20016) e.g. farm shops are not viable in remote areas where there is not a customer 
footfall. Thus ‘Off-the-books’ (Williams, 2010) and illegal entrepreneurial opportuni-
ties can be appealing to farmers. 
 
Table 2 presents change strategies which influence an entrepreneurs’, decision making 
processes to diversify irrespective of the legality of the diversification opportunity. 
Table 2 here 
Formal, or informal, planning is necessary in achieving strategic change but in farming 
circles much diversification is ‘script based’ being passed on in conversation between 
farmers. In criminal ventures, such knowledge is also usually script based too (and thus 
deniable). Potential business strategies are numerous, but can be classified within three 
broad groups, namely:- 
1. Competition via quality, or price (Porter, 1985). 
2. Product and service innovation (Storey, 1994). 
3. Market Niche Domination (Birley and Westhead, 1990). 
 
Each strategy outlined above represents a potential avenue for business development, 
and growth, and the adoption of specific skills, competencies and resource sets. Illegal 
entrepreneurial ventures can usually undercut the prices charged by legal ventures, and 
thus provide an edge to criminal entrepreneurs. Such individuals, therefore do not have 
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to rely on innovations, nor concern themselves with domination. Yet, exogenous factors 
will influence which of the strategies are most likely to be pursued. For example, in 
farming, farmers have very little control on competition paradigms or price setting. 
There is little scope for product or service innovation, and market niche domination is 
the province of a few rich farmers, or agricultural corporations, making small scale 
pluriactivity, diversification and segmentation opportunities more appealing. Unfortu-
nately, these are not always legal opportunities (Smith and McElwee, 2013; Somerville, 
Smith. McElwee, 2015).  
 
2.3. Pluriactivity, diversification and segmentation 
The literature on farm diversification is protean. There is a generic literature on seg-
mentation but there is a knowledge gap between theory and strategy implementation 
(Jenkins and McDonald, 1997). Few studies relate to the small business, agricultural 
and farm based sectors and few of these directly relate to segmentation frameworks, or 
diversification (McElwee and Smith, 2012). Pluriactivity and generating multiple in-
come streams are recognised strategies in farming (Carter, 1998). There is a small body 
of work in relation to illegal segmentation or diversification in farming particularly on 
the ‘strategic awareness capability’ of farmers (McElwee and Smith, 2012), ‘pluriactiv-
ity’ (McInerney et al, 1989) and on rural and farm based diversification strategies (Gas-
son, 1988; Ilbery, 1991; McNally, 2001; Meert et al 2005; Atterton and Affleck, 2010; 
and McElwee and Smith, 2012). This is focused on marginal farms (Meert et al (2005), 
and survivalist strategies (Niemelä, and Häkkinen, 2014). For these, authors, diversifi-
cation is a key driver in farm and rural business scenarios in improving economic via-
bility. It requires different skills and skill sets (including illegal diversification activi-
ties). The extended segmentation framework (McElwee, 2006) will outline these addi-
tional skills. Criminal diversification is a high-risk specialisation strategy, (McElwee, 
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et al, 2017) as criminal strategies face similar constraints, pressures and barriers placed 
on farmers as those encountered in legal diversification strategies.  
 
2.4. Expanding the segmentation framework for classifying farm diversification  
In this article, we build upon generic strategic frameworks available to small businesses 
(Porter, 1980; and specifically, McElwee and Smith, 2012) to enable a more nuanced 
understanding of entrepreneurial, and business, attitudes in the agricultural sector. 
These include: entrepreneurial skills, capabilities, personal mastery, transformational 
leadership, shared vision, absorptive capability, teamwork and organisational perfor-
mance necessary for entrepreneurial growth (McElwee and Smith, 2012). The informal, 
and criminal, diversification strategies discussed herein are dynamic, entrepreneurial 
capabilities (Teece, et al 1998; Winter, 2003) which can engender competitive ad-
vantage, or survival. Informal, and criminal, diversification strategies are cynical forms 
of strategic entrepreneurship (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996).  
There has been relatively little research that attempts to systematically segment the 
illegal sector. The personality of the farmer, and their propensity towards engaging in 
illicit behaviour is important. Farmers like other social actors have differing moralistic 
frames of reference. The possession of entrepreneurial alertness (Kirzner, 1979) for 
example, need not exclude a propensity towards making money using illegal methods. 
If an informal, or criminal, opportunity offers a more viable outcome than legitimate 
approaches, then the character, personality and circumstances of the individual farmer 
will determine whether to engage with the informal, or illegal, solution activities. 
Where strategic awareness meets with criminal temptation, then there is no predictable 
measure of the outcome. However, entrepreneurial behaviour and intention is not al-
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ways stable (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000) thus frameworks must be capable of en-
compassing, informal, and illegal actions. We turn now to consider methodological is-
sues. 
 
3. On Methodology and documenting illegal pluriactivity 
In framing this study to tell our stories of roguery (Tönnies, 1926), we combine sys-
tematic literature review methodology, which takes cognizance of sources that inform 
research syntheses – talk, observations and documents (see Onwuegbuzie, Leech and 
Collins, 2012) with documentary research (Scott, 1991, 2014); and internet mediated 
research [IMR] techniques (Jones, 1998; Hewson, Yule, Laurent and Vogel, 2003). We 
do so in a focused, purposeful way as a form of ethical, ‘Netnography’ (Kozinets, 2015) 
because we concentrate on the data, and the crime type, and not the named individual. 
We simultaneously, adopt a sociologically inspired, narrative perspective, emphasizing 
quantitative elements (Franzosi, 1998, 2010, 2014).3 We focus on narrative as a form 
of socio-historical data (Franzosi, 1998a and b) because our data is derived from events 
occurring over an extended period.         
 
3.1. Data collection   
                                                 
3 Individually, such sources are often called into question but collectively they inform evidence-based 
practice. A convincing literature review has the aesthetic qualities of a well written novel. An evidence-
based review comprehensively covers the field to reach the best intervention (Adolphus, no date) sum-
marizing and critiquing the literature to improve research practice and understanding of research meth-
ods. 
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The development of the previous iterations of the segmentation framework relied on 
questionnaire and survey methodology to gather data through standardized questions to 
elicit the required information to build the framework. However, as Gambetta (2000) 
argues, criminals communicate differently (in a more guarded manner) to others be-
cause they rely on maintaining secrecy from the authorities. We simply could not email, 
or post, a survey to rogue or criminal farmers. Firstly, as there was no extant database, 
we created our own excel spreadsheet. And secondly, as Gambetta suggests, as a norm 
active successful criminals are unlikely to cooperate with academics. To counter this, 
our methodological framework is based upon documentary research methodology 
(Scott, 1991/2014). We made a search of newspapers/internet via LexisNexis® using 
keywords to identify cases where farmers had engaged in farm-based criminality. The 
articles returned were mainly from UK and Irish newspapers and other media outlets. 
Others were from internet sources. To be included in our data sample/data base the 
published examples had to provide the names and addresses of the individual farmers 
being discussed for verification and corroboration purposes.  In addition, we searched 
for other articles on the crime/event to further corroborate that the crimes were reported 
in the public domain. This fits in with the ethical guidelines of Jones (1998), and 
Kozinets (2015) in conducting IMR. We treated the individuals named in the internet 
articles as anonymized, virtual subjects (Smith and Leigh, 1997). In creating these 
anonymous narratives, we took care to utilise qualitative analysis techniques (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994) to ensure that the themes which emerged were replicable and based 
on the media narratives. This process avoided the main ethical dilemmas of obtaining 
informed consent, debriefing, the public–private domain distinction, and confidential-
ity (Hewson, 2003). The point here is that these are real stories gathered from press and 
media reports (part anecdotal, and part biographical) and that collectively from an an-
alytic sociological context they constitute both qualitative and quantitative data 
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(Franzosi, 2010, 2014). We were aided in this by having used the same basic method-
ology to author a series of ‘nested’ case studies (Smith, 2004; Smith, 2011; Smith & 
Whiting, 2013; Smith & McElwee, 2013; Smith and McElwee, 2014; Somerville, 
Smith & McElwee, 2015). This assisted in the creation of the excel spreadsheet of 210 
cases from across the UK in which farmers had been charged with criminal offences 
relating to their occupation of farming. A limitation of the methodology is that we were 
reliant on the information published by journalists and in some cases unable to compare 
data.  
Our basic unit of analysis is the entrepreneur, because it is the actions of the entre-
preneur that make them either legal, or legal; alternative units of analysis are the enter-
prise and offence committed. Illegal entrepreneurs cannot be isolated from the business 
and environmental phenomena which impact upon them and, also, reaching agreement 
on how to define an illegal entrepreneur is problematic.4 However, as a proxy, it is the 
crimes committed by the individuals we focus on completing the cycle of anecdote, 
data, typology and theory. In this article, we are interested in what the underlying quan-
titative narrative tells us. 
 
4. Discussion and analysis 
Based on our readings and collective knowledge distilled from our empirical research, 
we constructed an excel spreadsheet of 210 rogue and criminal farmers. Of the 2010 
rogue-farmers, only three were female. This is not a gender based finding because it 
mirrors the organisational practices of farming in which the male head of the household 
                                                 
4
 Previous iterations of the segmentation framework did not include characteristics such as the entrepre-
neurs’ personality, character and moral outlook This may be because personality, character and morality 
are not easy questions to answer and often have to be assessed by others. They are not yes/no answers. 
Qualitative phenomena such as personal characteristics, ‘entrepreneurial alertness’ and ‘motivation’ to 
diversify, involve psychological underpinnings such as ‘perception’ and ‘cognition’ and the personal 
beliefs/value systems on the part of the actors involved; as such they are complex phenomena to inves-
tigate. 
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is designated as farmer. Table 3 provides a breakdown of the type of crimes and of-
fences encountered in the farming community. From this database, we identified typical 
crime types.  
Table 3 here 
We then sub-divided the sample into five categories of activity – Informal (On Farm); 
Environmental (On Farm); White-Collar (On Farm); Criminal (On Farm); and Criminal 
(Off Farm). What is interesting is that the type of crimes engaged in by criminal farmers 
are extensions of their everyday working knowledge as farmers and their rural social 
capitals (Hofferth & Iceland, 1998). Most are low entry and do not entail accessing 
large sums of money. The activities either provided additional income or saved money.  
Table 3 evidences the relevance and frequency of the crimes. The type of data 
collected is discussed in context and we present (anonymized) illustrative examples 
from cases cited in the table. The types of criminal activities encountered in the data 
were statistically more likely to be of the ‘on farm’ variety, rather than being ‘off farm’.  
An explanation for this may be that, farms are considered to be private land, to which 
the public and authorities do not have ready access.  The public generally respect such 
issues of privacy.  This makes any illegal activity occurring on such land easier to per-
petrate, because of the absence of public gaze.   
When taking cognizance of the informal/cash in hand category, we are consid-
ering ‘off the books’ transactions, which parallel legal business transactions and use 
industry based skill sets.  The main proviso here is that such activities are kept secret 
and not declared to the tax authorities.  Deniability is a key factor in play here, and there 
is no explicit acceptance of wrong doing acknowledged. 
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When considering the environmental crime category, it must be stressed that 
such offences are usually driven by money saving strategies or caused by pressures 
directly related to work issues.  Such practices are usually considered to be acceptable 
farming practices or folk crimes which bear no stigma.  There is no implicit acceptance 
of wrong doing.   
Thus, collectively, offences such as tax evasion and avoidance; using red diesel; 
avoiding vehicle excise or insurance documentation are considered to be acceptable 
cost saving strategies.  Similarly, minor insurance frauds (inflating genuine losses) and 
ghosting vehicles are also seen as being acceptable sharp practice as sometimes vehi-
cles only cross public roads to gain access to other land.  Even using illegal food addi-
tives and veterinary medicines are considered acceptable operating practices.  Many 
farmers teach themselves to carry out minor veterinary procedures.  In this respect, a 
degree of cruelty to animals is sanctioned, to avoid paying vet bills.  Engaging in other 
diversification strategies such as a puppy farm, are also considered as acceptable prac-
tice.  Again, secrecy and deniability are key factors in play and the excuse of ‘I am just 
a farmer’ are often used.  In this category farmers excuse their actions as being minor 
misdemeanors.   
When considering the category of ‘on farm’ criminal activity, there can be no 
doubt in the farmer’s minds that they are engaging in criminality.  Therefore, allowing 
a farm business to be used for money laundering or the disposal of chemicals and waste, 
is clearly illegal, similarly knowingly allowing criminals to store drugs and stolen prop-
erty, or use rented premises for drug production.  Here the farmer is crossing the line 
of deniability.  It is therefore difficult to argue that such income generating activities 
are acceptable.  When considering theft, such as stealing livestock or related farm prod-
ucts or resetting same, there can be no excuse.  Theft is theft.  However, engaging in 
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other illegal diversification strategies such as dog fighting and hen fighting and and 
illegal slaughtering practices, whilst criminal, are often tolerated within certain parts of 
the farming community.  Such practices, although illegal, are seen as partially accepta-
ble.  However, selling fertilizers to non-farm clients, and engaging in major fraudulent 
or corrupt schemes, are inexcusable.  Engaging in criminality, and vendettas through 
malice against other farmers, is a criminal, not business strategy.  Similarly, engaging 
in illegal migrant labour, and using slaves, is also an obvious criminal strategy.   
        The last category of ‘off farm’ criminal activity is palpably a criminal strategy as 
farmers know that their actions are criminal.  In this crime type, it is criminal social 
capital that is being cultivated, not rural or entrepreneurial social capital.  Such crimes 
are not condoned by the legitimate farming community. 
The instances of these serious crimes are not so prevalent in the data, but it must 
be remembered that the database was built using media accounts which relate to a focus 
on a single, or particular crime.  As a consequence, such media accounts rarely provide 
details of previous wrongdoing and it would be necessary to properly profile the ac-
cused, using the criminal records database, to establish if there is a pattern to the crime 
types engaged in by rogue and criminal farmers.  Access to such a database is beyond 
the scope of the academic research and would require a study sanctioned by the author-
ities.  There is however, limited evidence that some farmers repeatedly engage in more 
than one crime type during the course of their illegal business practices.  See McElwee 
(2008) and Smith and McElwee (2013) for an example of such activities.   
        From an analysis of the underlying narrative we suggest that a plausible explana-
tion for such strategic criminal behaviour is that of ‘Farmers Mentality (see Smith and 
Duncan, 2014) which is engaged in on a routine basis. 
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Farmers Mentality 
Is an ingrained, cultural and occupational mentality, or way of thinking. It results from 
a seasonal ‘man-versus-nature’ condition associated with the occupation because farm-
ers constantly battle against nature, the weather and opposing, oppressive market 
forces. Farmers endure periods of disruptive operational occurrences and remain opti-
mistic and resilient in the face of natural and man-made crisis. He, or she, often face 
catastrophic events and the sheer unpredictability of the occupation (cycles of boom-
and-bust). In terms of entrepreneurship theory, they endure the ‘gales’ of creative de-
struction (Schumpeter, 1942) as well as destructive creation caused by corporate agri-
enterprises. Farmers author their own legend and narrative.5 The farmer is an innovator, 
risk-taker and must engage in proactivity or brinksmanship. Above all, the stereotypical 
‘good-farmer’ must be seen to be fair but over time they develop an ‘occupational nous’ 
or mentality. This is a particular, collective, state of mind, an attitude, and bounded 
rationality.  
In farming, there is not the same sense of competition versus competitors as there 
is in other industries. The ‘good-farmer’ plays fair (or at least be seen to do so within 
their communities). Good husbandry, thrift and not spending are part of the stereotype 
of this mentality (See Smith and Duncan, 2014). It is related to financial shrewdness 
and thrift and parsimony. Negative perceptions of farmers suggest that they are mean, 
calculative and crafty as well as possessing legendary negotiating and money-making 
skills linked to market mechanisms and policy logics. Farmers are averse to waste, 
                                                 
5 We see two opposing stories or story types – that of ‘narratives of craft’ or ‘crafty narratives’. Narra-
tives of craft are good stories which educate and inspire future generations of farming stock. However, 
crafty tales are stories of greed and guile where the crafty farmer gets one over on peers or society. Crafty 
tales are also intended to act as a form of cautionary tale. A common theme in such stories is of farmers 
being willing to spend thousands on a tractor but not buy a byre brush or barrow when it is no longer 
functional. We are indebted to the work of Anne Smith (Smith and Duncan, 2014) in relation to our 
understanding of this storied nature of the concept.  
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wasting and wasters too and recycle most things and dislike wasting money. This is in 
turn linked to their everyday work practices and to social intelligence. Farmer’s men-
tality is a form of institutionalised coping mechanism. Glover (2014) speaks of charis-
matic farmers generating creative solutions to everyday problems and engaging in cre-
ative thinking as well as imagined futures. It is related to everyday working practices 
on the farm for example as a ‘Fix-it-Yourself’ problem solving strategy. It is a strategic 
and tactical behavioural mechanism. However, within the farming community there is 
an unwritten rule that farmers must respect each other thus rule violations are marked 
by penalties such as offending farmers being ostracized or other penalty being imposed. 
It thus relates to a general sense of ‘well-being’ – psychological, physiological and 
physical and of survival and surviving crisis.  
Farmers’ mentality is not a planned strategic intervention such as Ajzen’s theory of 
planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991) being more of an emergent behaviour.6 Nevertheless, 
there is a cynical, darker side to farmers’ mentality in that the same forces of socialisa-
tion which make it a ‘force-for-good’ can make it a ‘force-for-bad’ too because rather 
than waste a commodity they may be tempted to sell it on to defray costs. This can 
create repeat custom and a mutual obligation on regular customers and the cash-in-hand 
income generated can become quite lucrative. This example is a case of informal entre-
preneurship (Williams and Round, 2009) in action which creates and extracts value 
from the environment (Anderson, 1995) similarly to how a legal entrepreneurial trans-
action would do. Thus, the informal crimes and environmental crimes presented in table 
                                                 
6
 Ajzen argued that intentions to perform behaviors of different kinds can be predicted with high accu-
racy from attitudes toward the behavior, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control. These in-
tentions, together with perceptions of behavioral control, account for considerable variance in actual 
behavior. Attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control are shown to be related to ap-
propriate sets of salient behavioral, normative, and control beliefs about the behavior, but the exact nature 
of these relations is still uncertain. As a result, expectancy-value formulations are found to be only partly 
successful in dealing with these relations. Ajzen argued that the inclusion of past behaviour in the pre-
diction equation provides a means of testing the theory's sufficiency.  
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3 permit the farmer to engage in neutralization techniques because the actions are not 
viewed as crimes per se by the farming community. So-called white-collar crimes are 
often seen as excusable by the perpetrators as being industry specific offences – one is 
cheating the state not individuals and thus the stigma is neutralized – however, this is 
far from the case. There is always a victim. The real crimes are also of a hidden nature 
being committed on private land and it is common for farmers to plead that they were 
the victims of circumstance. In table 3, column 1 – 4 the activities are often an expan-
sion of the legal business conducted for economic gain, using additional capacity.  They 
exemplify an illegal form of integration. Often the activities require knowledge of other 
illegal entrepreneurs and cooperation against the authorities. In column 5 the activity is 
in a different illegal business domain. 
      Our adapted segmentation framework expands and develops our understanding of 
what these entrepreneurial skills are. This analysis bridges the gap in our understanding 
between legal core skills and illegal skills farmers. Whilst skills can be generic – it is 
the activities which may or may not be illegal. This framework offers a comprehensive 
mechanism for analysis of the farming sector by expanding existing typologies to in-
clude the criminal. Informal and criminal diversification strategies adopted by the farm-
ers in this study are not dependent on traditional management skills (Bolton, 1971; Sto-
rey, 1994; Gray, 1998) but upon the criminal adaption of core industry specific skills, 
knowledge and rural social capital (Hofferth and Iceland, 1998). This is important be-
cause some farmers are weak in traditional entrepreneurial skills, particularly business 
and management skills (McElwee and Annibal, 2010).  
        It is apparent that their diversification opportunities do not require access to tradi-
tional entrepreneurial or small business resources but to alternative markets where they 
can exercise their farming knowledge. These illegal strategies lean towards survival or 
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subsistence and diversifying into profitable alternative income streams to obtain sus-
tainable un-declarable flows of ‘hard cash’ and help maintain existing lifestyles (Gray, 
1998), or hedonistic indulgences. The need for farmers to engage in more pluriactivity 
and diversification strategies is driven by the current economic climate which has 
placed huge pressures on the EU farming industry overall (McElwee and Smith, 2012) 
exacerbated by other socio-political factors which force farmers to retire or lose tenan-
cies. Thus, informal, and criminal, diversification strategies are perhaps appealing be-
cause they do not as a general rule necessitate generating alternative income from non-
agricultural sources but are an extension of farm based knowledge. The entrepreneur 
usually possesses the land, the skill sets and the networked contacts to be able to operate 
effectively placing further restrictive barriers on what types of activities one can diver-
sify into (McElwee and Smith, 2012). This does not apply to informal or criminal di-
versification activities. 
This section highlights the barriers and broadens the discussion to general attitudes 
towards entrepreneurialism to include the informal and the criminal. We add to specific 
potential barriers to diversification, identified by McElwee (2004). 7  The financial 
landscape of farming has changed in the recession which is important because although 
in the past farmers may not have needed to raise capital from sources external to the 
family network this is no longer true. Whilst the family must remain the main source 
of risk and venture capital for most farmers (Casson, 1982) in terms of capital, labour 
and information there is a potential dark side to raising finance even in farming. 
Competitive advantage can be gained even by criminal means. We have thus addressed 
some societal nuances of farming family life. We must guard against criminal capital 
and criminal incentives being invested or laundered in farms and supporting businesses. 
                                                 
7
 These include poor management skills of farmers; Lack of entrepreneurial spirit; Limited access to 
business support; Farm tenancy agreements and Regulation.   
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Yet, we wonder what the true scale of informal and illegal venturing is in the farming 
community. It is perhaps time to have that debate?  
The same socio-economic forces which drive legal diversification, drive the illegal. 
Indeed, it will most likely be a reduction in, or loss, of income from a legal opportunity 
that triggers the engagement in illegal opportunities. Often, the only decision will be 
whether to engage in legal diversification versus illegal, specialisation. Smaller (and 
particularly marginal) farm units are vulnerable to economic pressures as many small 
farms make a loss. The combined impact of current low and negative incomes on owner 
equity in some sectors, and especially for tenant farmers, is potentially critical for 
substantial numbers of businesses and families (McElwee and Smith, 2012) are likely 
to trigger the uptake of illegal diversification activities. This leads to uncertainty within 
these businesses and families and to temptation. Therefore, the opportunities of 
diversification are a significant issue for farmers including informal, and criminal, 
solutions. Additional sources of farm-based income need not be restricted to the legal 
and to agricultural diversification. Opportunities to engage in legal diversification are 
dependent on a range of variables: the geographical location of the farm, the topography 
of the land, the economic infrastructure of the region, and the entrepreneurial propensity 
of the farmer (See McElwee and Smith, 2012). However, all opportunities for 
diversification need not be legal. As demonstrated, there are informal, illicit, or illegal 
“off-the-books” type diversification strategies available to desperate farmers. Farmers 
are not immune to behaving criminally, or engaging in ‘Illicit Rural Enterprise’ [IRE] 
(Smith and McElwee, 2013)., Diversification activities then, tend to be developed and 
staffed by family members. Conversely, criminal diversification opportunities may 
necessitate involving outsiders. 
The need to guard against the potential for a creeping criminalization of the industry 
is relevant because as more small farms and enterprises pass from family owned control 
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to institutional and corporate control the present form and structure of farming in 
Europe will inevitably change. Family owned farms are the norm in the UK (McElwee 
and Robson, 2005) and a change to other forms may see a rise in strategic 
entrepreneurial orientation or architecture.  
There are few experts or consultants capable of providing an ‘Enterprise 
Architecture’ (Rohloff, 2005) to mitigate against involvement. The subject is seldom 
discussed by farmers who have experienced informal and criminal diversification into 
new business ventures. Whereas conventional diversification farming strategies tend to 
be reactive (McElwee and Smith, 2012) farmers who participate in informal, and 
criminal, diversification activities/strategies towards diversification are more proactive 
which counters the findings of Aloulou and Fayolle (2005) in their study of 
entrepreneurial orientation in small business contexts. Informal, and criminal, 
diversification strategies are primarily engaged in by male farmers, not females. Bock 
(2004) and McElwee and Smith (2012) find that traditional legal farm diversification 
is the province of the female partners and constitute activities, traditionally been 
associated with the role of the woman on the farm e.g. Farm accommodation, or a Farm 
shop.   
 
5. Conclusions 
To conclude, this article makes a fresh contribution, by discussing common types of 
crime encountered in contemporary illegal business practices in the farming and food 
industries. As such it takes extant knowledge further along the theoretical continuum 
than the discussion and analysis of individual cases. It is of relevance that the crimes 
committed by rogue and criminal farmers (Smith, 2004) are mainly economically 
driven either to raise additional income or to save spending money. This fits into the 
darker side of ‘farmers-mentality’ (Smith & Duncan, 2014).  It is also relevant that in 
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the cases encountered by the authors very few of the accused farmers were branded as 
criminal by the press. Furthermore, this article is helpful to scholars of rural entrepre-
neurship because it provides a very practical addition to the literature, by extending the 
segmentation framework and by considering ‘Farmers Mentality’. It is also helpful to 
food scientists, business school scholars and criminologists because the knowledge 
base and conversation is multidisciplinary. The extended framework should be useful 
to the authorities and investigators as an “iterative device” which can be used as a pre-
dictive strategic tool. It is also timely given the publication of the food industry report 
by Morling and McNaughton, 2016). In this respect, it will also be useful from a prac-
titioner persective. The academic knowledge gained from such studies could be used to 
design investigative training packages for farm and food industry stakeholders. We 
have illustrated how complex illegal diversification and pluriactivity strategies are in 
the agricultural sector. It further proves that farming is not a homogeneous sector 
(McElwee, 2006) but one which operates in a complex and multi-faceted environment. 
This article, generates more questions and consternation than it has answered. Its thesis 
obviously requires further research projects in the field to develop and further articulate 
the key arguments and map the barriers and opportunities which face farmers tempted 
to engage in criminal actions and networks. The study has illustrated that in the agri-
cultural sector entrepreneurial skills and skill-sets include those associated with the in-
formal and criminal economies. There is a pressing need for funded interdisciplinary 
studies and collaborations with Government Agencies to establish how widespread 
such informal and illegal business practices are.  
Historically the motivators for farmers have not been overtly financial (McElwee 
and Smith, 2012). Thus, strategic decisions to engage in informal, and criminal, acts 
for financial gain may well be motivated by survival and subsistence instincts and by 
the austerity issues facing the farming and food industries, rather than profit 
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maximization and greed. CAP subsidies have created a dependency culture in farming 
and perhaps and this study demonstrates that a small cadre of farmers are prepared to 
adopt quite ruthless illegal diversification strategies rather than submit to market forces. 
The primary motivator for many farmers who adopt legal diversification strategies is 
that of business and personal survival and criminal diversification offers an alternative 
route for some farmers prepared to adopt a more strategic approach to entrepreneurship. 
It is possible that these issues will be acerbated by Brexit as EU loans and subsidies 
become unavailable to farmers and food industry stakeholders; and by the subsequent 
changes of legislation required in the UK. 
The data and examples in respect of the informal and criminal strategies can be 
compared against examples and categories from previous studies but we acknowledge 
that there are still missing variables which influence the framework. We further 
acknowledge, that we have only begun to understand the informal, and criminal, prac-
tices conducted in the farming industry. However, the possibility of using the frame-
work as a predictive analytic tool is very real despite difficulties of presentation and 
interpretation.  
This study further develops the classification to include criminal characteristics of 
diversification. Criminal diversification is part of the ‘enterprise architecture’ 
(Rohloff, 2005) within the agricultural and farm based business sector. These add to 
our understanding of the entrepreneurial nature of farmers. Clearly, some farmers uti-
lise legal, informal and criminal diversification strategies to survive. This suggests a 
dual form of strategic awareness and the capacity and capability to develop.   
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Figures & Tables 
 
 
Figure 1– Change Strategies for Illegal Entrepreneurs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: McElwee, G. (2006:188). 
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Table 1 – Dimensions influencing the decision to engage in illegal entrepreneurial prac-
tices 
 
Moral Legalistic Economic Social 
Shift in Moral vir-
tues 
Community belief 
Tax Morale 
Personal Percep-
tions 
Lure of certain pro-
fit 
Farmer’s mentality 
Corruption 
Direct pressure 
from Criminals / 
Oganized Crime. 
Higher Business 
Rates 
Regulation of the 
official Economy 
Trade Barriers 
Labour restrictions 
Increased Taxation 
Higher VAT 
Working Time Di-
rectives 
Threat of Bank-
ruptcy 
Threat of Foreclo-
sure 
Diminishing re-
turns 
Delayed payments 
from Govt. 
schemes. 
Unemployment 
Early Retirement 
Peer Pressure 
Fear of Failure 
Owing a favour 
Local custom / re-
pute 
 
 
 
Source: Author generated.  
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Table 2 – Change factors influencing decision to engage in diversification / pluriactivity 
 
Strategic Change Opportunity  
Discovery 
Individual 
Differences 
Psychological  
Differences 
Environmental 
Context 
Resource  
Acquisition 
Growth by expan-
sion  
Knowledge of 
how to serve 
markets  
Opportunity 
Cost 
Need for 
achievement 
The economic 
environment / 
Wealth 
Due dili-
gence 
Different use of 
capacity by spe-
cialisation 
Life experi-
ences 
Functional ex-
perience 
Risk taking Support availa-
bility 
Specialisa-
tion 
Growth by expan-
sion of production 
Access to  
information 
Industry expe-
rience 
Intuition The socio-cul-
tural environ-
ment 
Opportunity  
attributes 
Enlarge capacity 
by vertical inte-
gration 
Knowledge 
about markets 
General busi-
ness experi-
ence 
Desire for  
independence 
Capital availabil-
ity 
Information 
asymmetry 
Cooperation with 
other illegal entre-
preneurs  
Social ties Social posi-
tion/status 
Agreeableness Individualist / 
Collectivist 
Syndication 
/  
Social ties 
Diversification Information 
search 
Mar-
ried/working 
spouse 
Self-efficacy / 
overconfidence 
Capital availabil-
ity / Property 
rights 
Excessive 
risk  
taking 
Different 
 business 
Creativity Educa-
tion/Start-up 
experience 
Extroversion Freedom Uncertainty 
 
Source: Author generated. 
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Table 3– Types of illegal diversification and criminal pluricativities. 
 
41 
INFORMAL 
(ON FARM) 
Cash in Hand Transactions. 
These mainly infringe the 
morality/immorality dimen-
sion in relation to diversifi-
cation. There is an obvious 
economic dimension and 
there could be grey areas. 
There may be a social di-
mension re Raves and Festi-
vals. 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
(ON FARM) 
Money Saving Strategies’. 
The most obvious dimension 
here is economic and per-
sonal gain. The acts are all 
illegal. There may be a so-
cial dimension to folk 
crimes. 
WHITE-COLLAR 
(ON FARM) 
Money Saving + Income 
Generating Strategies. 
Again, the economic dimen-
sion predominates and the 
acts are committed in the 
knowledge that they are ille-
gal or at least an offence.  
CRIMINAL 
(ON FARM) 
Income Generating Strate-
gies. 
This category sees an escala-
tion in that all activities have 
a criminal and economic di-
mension.  
CRIMINAL 
(OFF FARM) 
Income Generating and Rep-
utational Strategies. 
This category is another es-
calation in that all activities 
have a criminal and eco-
nomic dimension not con-
nected to the legal dimen-
sion of the farm/business. 
Supply Meat direct to local 
Butchers & Restaurateurs. 
Sub-contract labour to other 
criminal farmers. 
Rent Property to third party 
on a ‘No Questions Asked 
Basis’ 
Knowingly or recklessly 
pollute water courses with 
slurry or effluent 
Treat Animals cruelly to 
avoid spending money 
Shoot or poison wildlife af-
fecting livelihood. 
Setting illegal traps. 
Tax Evasion                                                 
Use of Red Diesel  
Run vehicles without excise 
/ Insurance. 
Minor insurance Frauds by 
falsely reporting (or over es-
timating) the theft of live-
stock and equipment. 
Allow business to be used 
for money laundering. 
Accept money for disposal 
of hazardous chemicals or 
waste. 
Accepting money to harbour 
known criminals or to store 
firearms etc. 
Knowingly invest money in 
criminal businesses for high 
return on interest. E.g. Drugs 
deals.  
Receive direct payment for 
criminal action such as drug 
running or smuggling of 
contraband cigarettes.  
42 
Rent Fields for potentially 
Illegal Raves and Music 
Festivals 
Rent Property or accept 
money for long term or short 
term storage of items on a 
‘No Questions asked basis’. 
 
Committing animal trans-
portation offences. 
SEPA offences. 
Reckless disposal of car-
casses or not disposing of 
same. 
Folk-crimes such as poach-
ing on neighbours land. 
Folk-crimes such as Illegal 
brewing / stills 
Ghosting vehicles in a larger 
fleet. 
Purchasing illegal Veteri-
nary Medicines. 
Knowingly breaching cru-
elty to Animals offences. 
Engaging in ‘Puppy Farm-
ing’ and the trade in other 
Pets. 
 
 
 
 
Steal livestock (cattle sheep 
rustling). 
Reset or Fence stolen live-
stock. 
Accept money for launder-
ing stolen livestock on farm 
until slaughter. 
Theft of plant and equip-
ment from other farmers. 
Knowingly receiving or re-
setting stolen property. 
Renting out buildings / en-
gaging with Dog Fighting / 
Hen Fighting.  
Using illegal steroids or 
food additives in animal 
feed. 
Knowingly renting build-
ings to organized criminals 
and charging higher than av-
erage rents.  
Supplying firearms to crimi-
nals. 
Malfeasance in public office 
– e.g. use information ob-
tained as a local councilor 
for private gain. 
 
43 
Accepting cash for infor-
mation about neighbours to 
criminals. Being paid for in-
formation received. 
Engaging in Halal Meat 
Fraud or other food fraud 
crimes. 
MDA offences – Cannabis 
farming or Meth Labs. 
Sell fertilizers to Crime 
gangs / terrorists. 
Use outbuildings for prosti-
tution. 
Paying Organized criminals 
to enforce debts with other 
farmers / suppliers. 
Engage in CPA / Frauds. 
Engage in Bribery / corrup-
tion. 
Engage in cross border sub-
sidy frauds. 
44 
Use business such as tractor 
valeting as cover for dealing 
drugs to other farmers. 
Engage in vendetta against 
other farmers – fire-raising / 
vandalism / theft. 
Employing illegal immi-
grants as slave labour. 
Gang master crimes / con-
spiring with gang masters. 
Modern slavery. 
 
 
Source: Author generated.  
 
